Hosted droplets have a restrictive cloud firewall (F36 re-rated low); standalone
PostgreSQL trust accepted (F37); default SuperUser password is deliberate for
trials, but the licensed-mode change is enforced by the client only (F9 note).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From code: AyaNova listens on all interfaces on plain HTTP 7575 in every
template, hosted droplets included, with no firewall from the setup script (F36);
standalone PostgreSQL trusts local connections (F37); Linux hardening (F38).
F2 confirmed and extended; F9 extended (hosted droplets start with the default
SuperUser password). Review only, no code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
John's decision: DOMPurify to 2.5.x and Vuetify to the latest 2.x (2.6.16 as the
fallback if 2.7 does not build on Node 12.22.9), as an exception to the
front-end dependency rule, each proven by a full client build and Cypress.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From code: some record text is rendered as HTML without escaping (F33); shipped
DOMPurify and Vuetify are behind on security fixes (F34, needs a decision on
front-end packages); headers, CORS, Swagger and keys in URLs (F35). npm audit
run read-only and triaged. Review only, no code or dependency changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From code: F3 and F4 confirmed; F17 confirmed and re-rated medium (names and
links reach any address, no reports). New: SMTP certificate never checked (F30),
SMTP password returned to read-only roles (F31), SMTP credentials in the DEBUG
defaults of raven and sockeye source (F32; password to be rotated). Review only,
nothing sent.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F27 (high, confirmed on the local server): restricted roles get whole work-order
items through report data, rendering and export. From code: users with change
rights on Customer can give contact logins any role (F28); server-info gives
the DB ID and licence to every login (F29). Remaining routes without a role
check found OK. Review only, no code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From code: KPI interval criterion placed in SQL unchecked, reachable by staff
down to TechRestricted (F26, critical). F18 (pick-list search text) completed
by code. Data-list filters, sort, ClientCriteria, saved filters, search, other
KPI criteria and remaining raw queries traced and found safe. Review only.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
From code: logo upload accepts any content type and is served inline from the
app's origin (F23); translation import has no role check (F24); attachment and
export gaps (F25). F21 extended to the log and backup download routes; backup
delete found safe. Review only, no code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F19 (critical, confirmed on the local server): report template import has no
role check, so any login, customer contacts included, can add a template whose
JavaScript runs in the server's browser. From code: F20 (templates get the
renderer's token, SuperUser for customer notification reports, and unrestricted
network access), F21 (download file names from the URL not checked; Windows),
F22 (minor job and template gaps). Review only, no code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Routes the client calls for customer contacts, read from raven-client, with the
ownership check each id route needs, and the proposed shape of the fix
(allowlist in the token middleware plus per-route ownership checks).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
John's decision: 8.3.0 is not released until every finding is fixed or
explicitly accepted. The review therefore runs before the release, not after.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
John's decision: urgent, "next release" cases before 8.3.0; hosted and
self-hosted installations equally. Recorded in SECURITY-REVIEW.md and in the
NET10-PORT.md list of cases for this release.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Confirmed on the local server as the seeded contact: any customer's work order
by id (F13), other customers' service requests (F14), the full customer list
with phones and emails through pick lists (F15), the whole service schedule
(F16). Candidates from code: notification subscriptions for another user (F17),
pick-list search text placed in SQL unescaped (F18). Review only, no code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
F5 (critical, confirmed on the local server): the 2FA step accepts an empty or
missing temp token, so users with 2FA on can be logged into without a password.
F1 confirmed: with the placeholder secret a user's current token can be rebuilt.
F8 confirmed. New findings F6, F7, F9 to F12. Review only, no code changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Also removes the server-only /var/ayanova chown/chmod lines from the Linux desktop upgrade page.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Full Chrome 155 would not start under a Linux service user with no writable
home (chrome_crashpad_handler: --database is required). chrome-headless-shell
starts, and measured on a 1 GB droplet is 3-4x faster and smaller per render.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>