case 4726 - login lockout per login name and per address

Failed logins are counted in memory (util/LoginThrottle.cs): 10 per login
name or 50 per client address within 15 minutes, then attempts are refused
with 429 for the rest of the window without checking the password. A
correct password clears the login's count; loopback is not counted per
address. Each lockout is logged. F6 fixed (2FA part in case 4710).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

devdocs/modernization/NET10-PORT.md

@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ John's "next release" cases for AyaNova (exported 2026-10-24). Each is its own s
 | 4723 | Direct SMTP and direct notification: staff only, record rights | F3, F4. **Done**, plan revised with John: staff keep sending to any address (stock report template and a customer script use it); contacts refused in both actions, an address from a record needs read rights on it, direct notifications refused to subcontractors. Test `DirectSend` (the subcontractor case returned 204 on the old code). No changelog line: nothing that works changes |
 | 4724 | SMTP: certificate checked, password never returned | F30, F31. **Done** (certificate checked, opt-out config setting `AYANOVA_SMTP_ACCEPT_ANY_CERTIFICATE` with manual page; password masked as `********` and kept on save; test `SmtpPasswordHidden`; self-signed listener proof; changelog lines for both) |
 | 4725 | Sessions: password change ends sessions, exact-path token exemption, default SuperUser refused when licensed | F7, F8, F9. **Done** (sessions end on reset, administrator password change and login disabled; exact route exemption, inactive users refused; default-password SuperUser limited to changing it on a purchased licence, option A; test `Sessions`; John's click-through with a temporary licence override; manual and changelog) |
-| 4726 | Login throttling/lockout | F6 |
+| 4726 | Login throttling/lockout (raven and sockeye) | F6. **Done** (10 failures per login or 50 per address in 15 minutes, then 429 for the rest of the window; same in Sockeye, whose login is public; test `LoginLockout`; per-address limit proved with a forwarded documentation address) |
 | 4727 | Low severity hardening | F10, F11, F12, F22, F23, F25, F29, F35, F36, F38; the AyaNova half of F39 (DB ID not shown anonymously) |
 | 4681 | Sockeye: licence/trial request hardening (tagged sockeye, rockfish) | F40. **Done** (sockeye `cd3ebed`: rate limits, email check, cryptographic codes; rvf unchanged) |
 
@@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ Found during the port, out of scope. One line each.
 
 - `NotifyController.SendNotifySmtpDirectMessage`, User branch: the missing-address and inactive messages say "Vendor" instead of "User" (found in case 4723)
 - SMTP connection security mapping (`Mailer.cs`): "StartTls" connects with `useSsl: true`, which MailKit treats as TLS from the start (port 465), not STARTTLS (587); "None" uses STARTTLS when offered, which can be stripped. Correcting it could break customers using "StartTls" on port 465 (found in case 4724)
+- From F6 (case 4726), split off as separate changes: a password strength rule (not empty is the only rule today; seeded trial users use their login as password) is a new, visible feature; `limit_req` on `/api/v8/auth` in the hosted nginx configuration belongs in the `sockeye-client` setup script and affects every hosted droplet. Both are second layers behind the login lockout
 - Race in the notification system: a record saved while a matching notification subscription is being deleted fails with 500 (`anotifyevent_notifysubscriptionid_fkey` violation), and the user's save fails with it. Seen once in the integration suite (`CustomerCrud.CRUD`, run in parallel with subscription tests) during case 4724
 - **Case 4731 (John, priority 1, after 8.3.0):** a global notification setting "allow email to any address from the API and report scripts" for `notify/direct-smtp`; off for new installs, on for upgraded databases; when off, only a record's saved address. Follows from F3 / case 4723
 - `License.DoFetchAsync` (`License.cs:629-661`) rethrows at `x == 3`, so the fifth server (Sockeye) is never tried, and it can return `null` to a caller that dereferences it

devdocs/modernization/SECURITY-REVIEW.md

@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ take the next free number; a fixed or accepted finding keeps its ID and changes
 | F31 | Medium | **fixed in case 4724** | The SMTP password is returned to read-only roles (OpsAdminRestricted, BizAdmin, BizAdminRestricted) |
 | F32 | Medium | confirmed (code) | A real-looking SMTP account and password are in the DEBUG defaults in `raven` and `sockeye` source |
 | F34 | Medium | **fixed in case 4722** | Shipped client libraries behind on security fixes: DOMPurify 2.3.8 (wiki sanitiser), Vuetify 2.6.6 |
-| F6 | Medium | confirmed | No lockout or rate limit on login or the 2FA step; no password rules |
+| F6 | Medium | **fixed in cases 4710 and 4726** | No lockout or rate limit on login or the 2FA step; no password rules |
 | F9 | Medium | **fixed in case 4725** | Default SuperUser password (by design for trials), and an anonymous route that says whether it is still set |
 | F36 | Low | confirmed (code) | AyaNova listens on all interfaces on plain HTTP port 7575 in every template; hosted droplets are protected by a cloud firewall |
 | F37 | Low | accepted (John) | Standalone PostgreSQL accepts any local connection without a password (`trust`) |
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@ per-user or per-address lockout, and parallel requests are not slowed. Hosted ng
 as password). Fix options: count failures per login and per temp token with a short lockout;
 `limit_req` on `/api/v8/auth` in the hosted nginx template.
 
+**Fixed (2026-10-24).** 2FA: case 4710 (5 wrong codes clear the temporary token). Password login: case 4726, `util/LoginThrottle.cs` in AyaNova and Sockeye (Sockeye's login is public too; only SSH to its droplet is limited to the office address). Failures are counted in memory: 10 per login name or 50 per client address within 15 minutes, then attempts are refused with 429 "Too many failed login attempts" for the rest of the window, without checking the password; a correct password clears the login's count; unknown logins are counted the same way. Loopback is not counted per address (the hosted nginx and IIS pass the real client address through the forwarded headers, which are trusted from loopback only). Each lockout is logged as a warning. Accepted: an attacker can keep a known login locked by failing 10 times every 15 minutes. Proved in both servers, the per-address limit through `X-Forwarded-For` with a documentation address; test `LoginLockout`. The password rule and nginx `limit_req` are in Deferred in `NET10-PORT.md`.
+
 ### F7 Password change does not end sessions; download key loses its expiry (pass 2)
 
 `UserBiz.ChangePasswordAsync` (used by change-password and reset-password) does not replace